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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KIM J. TANNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
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Court of Appeals 
No. 890521-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
Appellant Kim J. Tanner submits the following Reply to 
Respondent's Brief pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals: 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT HAS NEITHER ACKNOWLEDGED 
NOR RESOLVED THE STATUTE'S AMBIGUITY. 
Respondent Phoenix does not acknowledge the ambiguity 
in U.C.A. §3lA-22-307(l)(b)(ii). The statute refers to "$20 per 
day" but does not state whether "day" means "day of disability" 
or "day in which services are received." It does not clarify 
matters to simply assert: 
The literal reading of this section is that a 
$20 per day limit is placed on services 
actually rendered or reasonably incurred that 
day. (Brief of Respondent, p. 6.) 
Plaintiff has acknowledged the inherent ambiguity in 
the statutory language. In arguing for the "day of disability" 
interpretation, she has shown that her position is supported by 
prior legislation, construction rules requiring liberal and 
equitable interpretation, logical consistency with related 
provisions, and the only court case squarely on point which 
counsel have discovered. 
POINT II. 
THE QUESTIONS OF FAMILY SERVICES AND 
RESTAURANT MEALS SHOULD BE RESOLVED. 
In spite of the defenses set Corth in its Answer 
(Record pp. 8-9), respondent Phoenix contends that "issues 
concerning allowance for services by family members and 
restaurant meals are moot and not properly on appeal." (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 5.) 
The present appeal arises out of an action for 
declaratory judgment authorized by U.C.A. 31A-2-307. Such an 
action requires only that the petitioner have a substantial 
interest in the matter being interpreted. Phoenix's interest is 
undeniable. 
Plaintiff Tanner has opposed Phoenix's interpretation 
in the trial court (Kim Tanner's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Record pp. 10-11; Brief in Support of Kim Tanner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Record pp. 16, 20-21.) Her Motion for Summary 
Judgment determining these issues against Phoenix was denied. 
The issues are properly before this Court on appeal. 
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POINT III. 
NEITHER JAMISON NOR THE REVOKED 
STATUTORY INTENT LANGUAGE IS IN POINT. 
Respondent has sought to support its position by 
reference to Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 559 
P.2d 958f 960 (Utahf 1977), and former U.C.A. §31-41-2. 
Jamison dealt with issues quite different than those 
presented here. It was decided under the original version of the 
No-Fault Household Services statute which provided $12 per day 
whether or not expenses were actually incurred. In Jamison, $12 
per day was sought for the lost services of an injured boy. The 
court balked and essentially determined that the family could not 
have reasonably incurred any expenses to replace the boy's 
services. Since no reasonable expenses were possible, the $12 
per day was not payable. 
The Court's concerns in Jamison were addressed by the 
Legislature in Laws 1979 Chapter 1190, Section 1. The No-Fault 
Household Services statute was therein amended to provide 
benefits only for "services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for his household." This 
requirement of actual expenses or services makes Jamison moot. 
Phoenix cites Jamison for a legislative objective "to 
effectuate . . . savings in the rising costs of automobile 
accident insurance." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-9.) This 
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language comes from U.C.A. §31-41-2 which was repealed in Laws 
1985 and not re-enacted. It is not an objective of the present 
Insurance Code, the purposes of which are set out in U.C.A. 
S31A-1-102. 
Phoenix asserts that "Plaintiff here seeks to recover 
payments automatically" (Respondent's Brief, p. 9) with the 
purpose of drawing an analogy to Jamison. This is very 
inaccurate. Under plaintiff's interpretation, no claimant would 
receive more than the value of services actually received or 
expenses reasonably incurred. 
POINT IV. 
ADMINISTRATION IS NOT COMPLICATED BY 
APPELLANT'S INTERPRETATION. 
Phoenix asserts that "Plaintiff's interpretation is 
cumbersome, leads to uncertainty, delay, and increased expense 
and cost." (Respondent's Brief, p. 14.) This assertion is based 
upon two basic premises: 1) a carrier might overpay claims by 
anticipating a longer period of disability than actually occurs, 
and 2) a $20 per day of services limit speeds processing by 
relieving the carrier from the burden of scrutinizing each claim. 
Neither assertion should be persuasive. 
A carrier can avoid overpayment by the simple expedient 
of never paying more in the aggregate than $20 times elapsed days 
of disability. Claims would first be approved as to actuality 
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and reasonableness. Elapsed days of disability would then be 
calculated. Approved claims would be paid up to an aggregate 
amount of $20 per day of disability. This is not a difficult 
administrative task and can be updated monthly. 
Phoenix argues that the legislature must have intended 
"$20 per day of services" because this minimizes the insurer's 
burden of verification. To begin with, such an intention is not 
supported by the statute or its history. More interestingly, the 
argument points out precisely why Phoenix's position is not 
liberal or equitable. 
The only reason "$20 per day of services" would reduce 
an insurer's burden of verification is because it consistently 
undercompensates insureds. Suppose an injured housewife has a 
housekeeper come once a week for six hours at $10 per hour, not 
recognizing the pit allegedly dug by her legislature. The 
insurer requires name, date, hours, and pay rate then grants only 
$20, secure in the knowledge that if its insured claims six hours 
there were probably at least two hours actually worked. This is 
not equity. This is not a liberal remedy for the injured. This 
is simply a ploy to reduce expenditures. 
POINT V. 
GULLA IS PRECISELY ON POINT. 
Phoenix distinguishes Gulla v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 
180 N.J. Super. 413, 434 A.2d 1158 (1981) on the grounds that the 
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New Jersey statute does not permit compensation for gratuitous 
services received as opposed to expenses incurred. This 
difference allegedly increases the burden of insurers to verify 
claims, A limit of $20 per day of services supposedly reduces 
this burden upon the insurer, if not the insured. 
The distinction lacks a true difference. All that is 
required to convert a gratuitous service to an expense is a 
request for payment. What the party rendering service does with 
the compensation is up to that party. He or she may simply 
assign the compensation to the injured person or choose to never 
collect. An insurer's verification concerns are not 
substantially increased by allowing compensation for gratuitous 
services. 
Gulla represents the only case found by counsel in 
which the exact issue presented to this Court has been ruled 
upon. The reasoning behind the New Jersey decision is sound. A 
liberal, remedial interpretation of a statute strikingly similar 
to Utah's No-Fault Household Services Benefit required rejection 
of f,$20 per day of services." 
CONCLUSION 
The No-Fault Household Services Benefit is undeniably 
ambiguous on the issue presented to this Court. It is only by 
reference to statutory history, rules of construction, and case 
law that a proper interpretation can be made. 
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That ambiguity is resolved consistently by these tools. 
The history of the statute shows that days of disability was the 
original criteria for compensation but was later restricted to 
actual expenses and services. Liberal, equitable, and internally 
consistent interpretation points again to compensation based upon 
days of disability but limited to actual expenses and services. 
Case law confirms the analysis a third time. 
Appellant respectfully urges the Court to resolve the 
ambiguity by ruling that this allowance is based upon days of 
disability, not days of service. 
DATED this </Q day of January, 1990. 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
>. iTsfnne 
Attorneys Vor P 
Appellant 
ff and 
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